Lawyers in the Hot Seat: The State of Ethics & Professionalism by Hopkins, Hon. Jeffery P. et al.
DePaul Business and Commercial 
Law Journal 
Volume 6 
Issue 4 Summer 2008: Symposium - Lawyers, 
Law Firms & the Legal Profession: An Ethical 
View of the Business of Law 
Article 6 
Lawyers in the Hot Seat: The State of Ethics & Professionalism 
Hon. Jeffery P. Hopkins 
Ronald R. Peterson 
Catherine E. Vance 
Mark D. Yochum 
Follow this and additional works at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/bclj 
Recommended Citation 
Hon. Jeffery P. Hopkins, Ronald R. Peterson, Catherine E. Vance & Mark D. Yochum, Lawyers in the Hot 
Seat: The State of Ethics & Professionalism, 6 DePaul Bus. & Com. L.J. 557 (2008) 
Available at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/bclj/vol6/iss4/6 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Law at Via Sapientiae. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in DePaul Business and Commercial Law Journal by an authorized editor of Via Sapientiae. 
For more information, please contact digitalservices@depaul.edu. 
Lawyers in the Hot Seat: The State of
Ethics & Professionalism*
Honorable Jeffery P. Hopkins, Ronald R. Peterson,
Catherine E. Vance, and Professor Mark D. Yochum
MS. VANCE: Thank you to everybody for coming.
It's no secret that the public doesn't think a whole lot of our profes-
sion, but we brought some numbers to share with you about what they
actually think. There was a survey in 2007, a Harris Poll that asked
people whether they thought the law was a prestigious profession.'
Twenty-two percent said the law had very great prestige, twenty per-
cent said considerable, forty-one percent gave us some, and seventeen
percent said hardly any prestige at all. So we're not doing so well
there.
The good news for those numbers is we went up from a low of fif-
teen percent in 2002. So we are on the rise. In 1977, however, thirty-
six percent of people thought that the law had very great prestige.
MR. PETERSON: So we're still ahead of politicians and TV
anchormen.
MS. VANCE: Actually I'm not sure on that.
More importantly, there was a survey in 2006 that asked, "Can law-
yers be trusted to tell the truth?"' And the respondents said-twenty-
seven percent of them said they would trust lawyers while sixty-eight
percent said that they would not trust lawyers to tell the truth.3 And of
the twenty-two professions asked about in that survey, only actors did
worse than lawyers. 4
Even though we're talking about lawyers, the whole system comes
into play. And so that survey also asked whether people thought
* This is an edited version of the transcript from the third panel at the DEPAUL BUSINESS
AND COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL SYMPoSiuM, Lawyers, Law Firms & the Legal Profession: An
Ethical View of the Business of Law, held on May 1, 2008.
1. THE HARRIS POLL #77, FIREFIGHTERS, SCIENTISTS AND TEACHERS Top LIST As "MosT
PRESTIGIOUS OCCUPATIONS," ACCORDING TO LATEST HARRIS POLL (2007), http://www.harris
interactive.com/harris.polI/index.asp?PID=793.
2. THE HARRIS POLL #61, DOCTORS AND TEACHERS MOST TRUSTED AMONG 22 OCCUPA-
TIONS AND PROFESSIONS: FEWER ADULTS TRUST THE PRESIDENT TO TELL THE TRUTH (2006),
http://www.harrisinteractive.comlharris-poll/index.asp?PID=688.
3. Id.
4. Id.
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judges could be trusted to tell the truth.5 And, good news, Judge Hop-
kins, seventy percent said that they trusted judges to tell them the
truth. 6 That was down from seventy-nine percent in 1998.7 But, again,
in 2002-everybody seemed to take a dip in 2002-it was sixty-five
percent. 8
In a different survey on judges and perceptions of fairness, and this
isn't as relevant to those of us in bankruptcy but it's still an interesting
perception of what the public is thinking, people were asked to com-
pare judges to juries in terms of who they thought would issue a fair
verdict. 9 Twenty-three percent said they trusted the judges to be fair
while fifty percent put their faith in the juries.10 If you're found guilty,
however, the public didn't want the juries issuing a sentence because
forty-eight percent said that they trusted the judges to be more fair,
and only thirty-one percent went with the jury.11
So, so far we're not doing too well. The judges are trustworthy when
it comes to what they say, but none of us are doing very well at all.
This is one of my favorite results: honesty and ethical standards.
People were asked in a 2007 Gallup Poll to rate the honesty and ethi-
cal standards of lawyers. 12 Any guesses on what percent said "very
high?" Two. 13 Thirteen percent said "high."'1 4 The biggest vote was
"average" at forty-nine percent.1 5 Twenty-five percent said "low, ' 16
and ten percent said "very low.' 7 So over a third of people had law-
yers' honesty and ethical standards at "low" or "very low,"", and only
fifteen percent were "high" or better.' 9
Again our judges fared better than lawyers who appear before
them. Only eight percent said "very high," but thirty-eight percent
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. THE HARRIS POLL #61.
8. Id.
9. THE HARRIS POLL #9, JUST UNDER THREE IN FIVE AMERICANS BELIEVE JURIES CAN BE
FAIR AND IMPARTIAL ALL OR MOST OF THE TIME (2008), http://www.harrisinteractive.com/har-
ris_polI/index.asp?PID=861.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. GALLUP POLL, HONESTY / ETHICS IN PROFESSIONS (2007), http://www.gallup.com/potl/
1654/Honesty-Ethics-Professions.aspx.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. GALLUP POLL.
18. Id.
19. Id.
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said that judges had a "high" standard of honesty and ethics.20 Forty-
one percent put it at "average," 21 and twelve percent were mixed with
"low" and "very low."'22 So, again, Judge Hopkins is better than the
rest of us.
Does the public trust the justice system? This is, I think, probably
one of the most important questions that we can ask ourselves as law-
yers. The question was, "How much confidence do you have in the
people running the justice system?" 23 Twenty-one percent said they
had a great deal of confidence and, unfortunately, fifty-two percent
had only some and twenty-six percent had hardly any.24 So that's
nearly eighty percent that have a faltering confidence in the entire
justice system. And this was in 2007.
So that's the end of the data, and I think that we've pretty much
borne out what Professor Livingston opened the day with. The public
doesn't think a lot of us.
One of the things that we want to explore today is, you know, the
extent to which we bring this on ourselves by the way we act. And,
Ron, I think you have some examples of things that might prove the
public right?
MR. PETERSON: Well, we are suffering in many respects from a
total lack of civility. All of you have dealt with the Stalingrad defense,
the strike suit, and people just having a plain bad hair day. Let me
share with you perhaps one of the worst examples I found in a case
that dealt with over one hundred million dollars in damages and that
is the Paramount Pictures security litigation.25
Over a hundred million bucks at stake and this case gets up to the
Delaware Supreme Court and Chief Justice Veasey is writing about a
twenty-six page opinion affirming the chancellor and then sits down
and takes a five page supplement to compliment the lawyers on their
deposition-taking skills. Let me share with you that transcript, Mr.
Johnston must be a young lawyer from the way I read this transcript:
Mr. Johnston: Okay. Do you have any idea why Mr. Oresman was
calling that material to your attention?
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. GALLUP POLL.
23. THE HARRIS POLL #19, CONFIDENCE IN LEADERS OF MAJOR INSTITUTIONS: SMALL Busi-
NESS TOPS THE LIST THIS YEAR (2007), http://www.harrisinteractive.com/harris-poll/index.asp?
PID=735.
24. Id.
25. Paramount Commc'ns, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1993).
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Mr. Jamail: Don't answer that. How would he know what's going on
in Mr. Oresman's mind? Don't answer it. Go on to your next
question.
Mr. Johnston: No Joe-
Mr. Jamail: He's not going to answer that. Certify it. I'm going to
shut it down if you don't go to your next question.
Mr. Johnston: No. Joe, Joe-
Mr. Jamail: Don't "Joe" me, asshole. You can ask some questions,
but get off that. I'm tired of you. You would gag a maggot off a
meat wagon. Now, we've helped you every way we can. 26
So my first question is to the professor. If you were young Mr. John-
ston, what would you do at this point of the discussion?
PROFESSOR YOCHUM: You know, I had one deposition in my
life and-
JUDGE HOPKINS: It wasn't as contentious, hopefully.
PROFESSOR YOCHUM: What was worse, I was the witness. So I
would have run out of the room. But I probably would have done
little.
MR. PETERSON: Well, we get a case that is really recent, 2007,
from Judge Easterbrook, Redwood v. Dobson,27 and here you have a
lawyer party married to her counsel and they do not particularly care
for the opposing attorney and his client, but in the course of the depo-
sition-and this has nothing to do with the subject-they keep asking
the defendant if he is a homosexual and has he had a homosexual
affair and then they go on and ask about his secretary and have you
had an affair with your secretary? And this goes on and on and on.
Now, what do you suppose Judge Easterbrook would have done?
Judge, what would you have done in such a deposition?
JUDGE HOPKINS: Now that I've read the case, I'd probably
pause and seek leave of court to have that deposition stopped, those
questions interrupted, and to seek a protective order and sanctions
pursuant to Rule 26(c) 28 against the other side for conduct really un-
becoming of a lawyer.
MR. PETERSON: It's amazing this lawyer took it, he just let this
couple run all over him; the deposition was heated.
Judge Easterbrook ultimately entered a very severe censure against
the lawyer and his wife for conduct unbecoming of an attorney, then
turned around to the poor lawyer who was defending this deposition
and gave him an admonishment for not getting up and walking out of
26. Id. at 53-4.
27. Redwood v. Dobson, 476 F.3d 462 (7th Cir. 2007).
28. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c) (2007).
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the room after making a motion on the record pursuant to Rule 3729
to terminate the deposition.
So the moral of the story, I suspect, is that we lawyers are some-
times egged on by our clients. Some clients want to see gun slingers.
Clients are uncomfortable if we get along with our opposing counsel
and what we've seen is a pattern among some lawyers of taking this
profession to a new low in terms of its civility and with that the pub-
lic's respect for the bar.
JUDGE HOPKINS: But, Ron, let me turn it around. Let me ask
you a question. I mean that's the case that we find, but what do you do
though? I mean clients will pound sand and go somewhere else where
they'll get a lawyer less civil who's going to do what it is that they bid
them to do.
MR. PETERSON: Well, as much as I love collecting fees from my
clients, part of my job is not only to be an advocate, but to be a coun-
selor. And I will sit down with a client and I will tell him that such
conduct is counterproductive and if we get to that impasse where he
wants somebody who's going to engage in unethical conduct, he can
go hire the guy down the street for all I care.
MS. VANCE: But what do we do about the guy down the street, if
we consider ourselves members of a profession, in light of the data
and what the public thinks about us and how little confidence they
have in the system?
MR. PETERSON: I think that's where the judges come in and keep
record when these types of things take place. If the courts don't step
in when lawyers are way out of line, in these two cases I've given you
they were way out of line, there's going to be no order in the barnyard
and it's going to spread.
I mean, we gave you another case, this really happened last year,
some lawyer stood up in front of a federal judge with whom he's en-
gaged in an argument and says to her, "You're a few french fries short
of a Happy Meal."'30
MS. VANCE: I think he said "with due respect."
MR. PETERSON: Judge, what would you do if somebody said
that?
JUDGE HOPKINS: Judge Laurel Isicoff of Southern Florida in
Miami handled that probably the best way you can. She went on with
the proceeding, asked the attorney to go ahead with his argument,
29. FED. R. Civ. P. 37 (2007).
30. Order to Show Cause, Goldberg v. Mount Sinai Med. Ctr. of Greater Miami, Inc., No. 07-
1210-BKC-LMI (Bankr. S.D. Fla. May 21, 2007).
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although apparently they didn't agree on the point that he was trying
to make. She then put out an order to show cause why that attorney
should not be suspended from the practice or held in contempt.
Then she had a full-blown hearing on the record where that lawyer
appeared with his managing partner in tow representing him, quite
contrite. The attorney had also done some things that really showed
that he was attempting to mitigate the circumstances. He also apolo-
gized to the judge and made it appear that he was really, really sorry
for what he'd done.
MS. VANCE: I'd like to ask any of you to what extent do you think
that attorney's punishment came more from the publicity? Because
that was such a shocking statement, of course it made, I don't know if
it made any headlines in the general news media but certainly within
the bankruptcy community, there were quite a number of stories and
he became a notorious attorney rather quickly-to what extent that
served as his punishment which ended up completely outside the
system.
MR. PETERSON: But that was the tip of the iceberg. The client
fired them. He was removed as the chairman of that firm's bankruptcy
practice and basically in many respects, his career has been ruined.
JUDGE HOPKINS: Right. I thought the severity of the punish-
ment that the attorney received in retribution from his own colleagues
and clients was far greater than what the judge did. The only thing
Judge Isicoff did was require the attorney to attend five hours of pro-
fessionalism training which he'd already done prior to the hearing to
sort of mitigate the damage he'd caused.
PROFESSOR YOCHUM: Can I make a comment? I mean this is
small, but in your individual states, particularly I know Pennsylvania's
done it and other states think about it, they do issue from time to time
what they call codes of civility.31 These are in the nature of, by defini-
tion, aspirational rules. And I was going to talk about the language. I
teach at a Catholic school and swearing in court is bad, swearing in
deposition.
One wonders whether this sort of aspirational rule gets through, as
Cathy was suggesting, to the public. When they hear the Happy Meal
story, maybe it's not that he was sanctioned and that the legal profes-
sion is improving, it's rather, well, there's another instance of a low-
life lawyer.
MS. VANCE: And sometimes I don't think that they hear about the
follow-up because there was a 2002 survey within the American Bar
31. 204 PA. CODE § 99.3 (2000).
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Association 32 and one of the impressions that was taken from the sur-
vey is that people recognize that this could be a situation of bad ap-
ples, but they don't think that the profession as a whole deals with its
bad apples appropriately.
And I think-because I didn't see follow-up stories on what hap-
pened to that attorney-perhaps sometimes it's like any other news
story, the shocking thing that happens first gets the attention, but then
the public is left to think that this guy just said this to a judge and that
was the end of it. Much like the lobbyist who said that bankruptcy
judges aren't real judges. Yes?
A PARTICIPANT: I would submit that actually the publicity about
the french fry remark in the court is not surprising anybody in the
public and that's why you're getting those quotes on why people think
lawyers are liars and creeps, why people don't trust them. Both from
the people who think that it doesn't surprise them that a lawyer's go-
ing to do it, or it doesn't surprise them that maybe the judge deserved
it, and maybe the judge was a couple of french fries short of a Happy
Meal. The most damage is not to the attorney, but to our profession,
because that's the news story. Everybody thinks lawyers should be-
have that way and that simply underscores it.
MS. VANCE: Well, honestly, we've had some discussions about this
and I don't want to wonder too far off our point, but if you chase back
through history, you have to go back pretty far to find a point at which
there wasn't disdain for attorneys. And I think it was Adam saying to
Eve, the reason this is a paradise is because there are no lawyers.
People have hated us for a very long time. Professor Yochum, I
think, has studied some of that and can go into, what, BC?
PROFESSOR YOCHUM: Not quite BC, but a little CC, we law-
yers have been hated for a long time. There's no doubt about that. I'm
not sure I want to do that.
You want to move on to advocacy? Is that my cue?
MS. VANCE: Yes, it is your cue because I think that it's an impor-
tant component that people can see us as uncivil and disrespectful, but
they also think that we waste a lot of time making frivolous
arguments.
PROFESSOR YOCHUM: Keeping along with the McDonald's
theme, one of the obvious clich6s of bad lawyer behavior are frivolous
lawsuits, and that's the McDonald's coffee cup case, whether it's true
or not.
32. ABA CENTER FOR PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, SURVEY ON LAWYER DISCIPLINE SYS-
TEMS (2002), http://www.abanet.org/cpr/discipline/sold/toc_2002.html.
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And my task here is to talk a little bit about frivolous litigation. I
am a failed tax lawyer as well as not a very good litigator either. One
of the things I like about these conferences is that you live in a partic-
ular world, bankruptcy, debt collection, etcetera, but I get to move
across.
And the problem of frivolous advocacy in tax has been around for a
long time. You could file a tax return and it's hidden, that is, there's an
audit lottery. And similarly you see, particularly in Chapter 7 prac-
tices, there are a lot of cases that are going through. It's been a long
time, about twenty years that tax practitioners are restricted in their
advocacy. We're not allowed to advocate before the IRS any position
that doesn't have a better than one in three chance of winning. And
recently they have adjusted that last year to more probable than not.
So advocacy restrictions are around. They've been coming around.
One wonders what stopped frivolous litigation a thousand years ago
during the age of trial by combat. Well, that stopped it automatically.
If you lost in trial by combat, you lost your hand or your head and so
there was less likelihood of bringing that sort of litigation.
And the other thing I want to say is we're an oath-based system. I
know this is off the beat, but when Cathy was going through the list-
are lawyers liars? Every one of us signed an oath, took an oath, swore
probably to God, the United States, the Constitution. I wonder
whether that reaches home any longer for people.
Frivolous litigation. The major rule, and it's similar in all the states
and the Federal Courts, is ABA (I'll tell you the Model Rule) 3.1: A
lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding or assert or controvert
an issue unless there is a basis in law and fact for doing so that is not
frivolous. 33
One of the problems with legal education is we have taught you that
nothing is frivolous, right? You probably had some torts law professor
whose method was jerking you around to persuade you. He'd say the
sky is blue, it's really blue, and then a half hour later it's green, it's
gray. Right? We are trained to find that which is not frivolous.
I would divide frivolity into two parts, that is fact-based frivolity
and legally-based frivolity. While one is bringing an action that is not
legally justified, the other is bringing an action that the law is well
understood but the facts are uncertain.
It has only been recently, at least in my view, that there has been
aggressive identification of the lawyer with the client's activity. The
person that got nicked before for bringing in unmeritorious litigation
33. ABA MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.1.
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was really the client. They would lose. Now we still do not see any bar
association sanctions for frivolous behavior. Not a one. I look around
the country all the time. But what you see is this idea filtering through
statutes and rules. Statutes that are involved in fee shifting and of
course Rule 1134 and its bankruptcy cousin, Rule 9011. 35
The traditional rule with respect to litigation actually, and this is a
thousand years old too, that the lawyer was in charge of the law and
the client was in charge of the facts. The client comes to your office
and tells you a story. What are you supposed to do? Are you supposed
to cross-examine your client or are you to believe him?
In any case, Rule 9011,36 as you know, can create the imposition of
personal liability on the attorney and throughout BAPCPA37 now we
see things that are in the nature of things in the frivolous area. This
affirmative obligation on the part of practitioners, particularly with
respect to schedule preparation or advocacy to make some sort of in-
quiry, the line drawn is frequently reasonable inquiry into the facts of
a particular case, and we see, I think increasingly, personal liability on
the attorneys, which is consistent obviously with Rule 9011.38
I should also note, and I think it's probably in our material some-
where, that there is increasing tort liability. This is completely outside
of the rule system. Obviously you can have liability in the courts, but
we see increasing actions against lawyers who are bringing actions for
some plaintiffs out there that are non-meritorious.
What is a frivolous position? Well, it's obviously unknown. But we
have included in the materials a number of cases that you might say
are frivolous in nature and indeed the gravamen of the sanctions in
those cases is frivolity. 39
And I don't know whether it's appropriate for me to mention, but
we have at the beginning the summary of cases on mortgage creditors
and services. Is this all right to talk about these a little bit?
MS. VANCE: Sure.
34. FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
35. FED. R. BANKR. P. 9011.
36. Id.
37. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat.
23 (2005).
38. FED. R. BANKR. P. 9011.
39. In re Allen, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 2063 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. June 18, 2007); In re Porcheddu,
338 B.R. 729 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2006); In re Rivera, 342 B.R. 435 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2006) affd
Schwartz v. United States Trustee's Office (In re Rivera), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47345 (D.N.J.
June 29, 2007); In re Gorshtein, 285 B.R. 118 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2002); In re Fagan, 376 B.R. 81
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007); In re Osborne, 375 B.R. 216 (Bankr. M.D. La. 2007).
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PROFESSOR YOCHUM: I won't go through each in detail, but it's
again this routine work. It is routinely using pre-signed certifications
of default without having any understanding whether in fact the
debtor in a particular Chapter 13 case or whatever had engaged in a
default on the mortgage itself.
JUDGE HOPKINS: Professor Yochum, that's what really sort of
struck me as I read through our case material for today. All of these
cases involve creditors' misbehavior or malfeasance if you will,
whereas sections 526 through 528 of the Bankruptcy Code40 are di-
rected more at the conduct of the "debtor's" attorney.
I don't want to revisit the Commission's Report, nor the minority
view expressed therein that eventually became the law, but it struck
me that all the miscreant lawyer conduct we're discussing here oc-
curred on the creditor's side and was not done by debtor's attorneys.
MS. VANCE: Well, actually the commission did discuss false claims
by creditors. And that was set aside as not meriting attention. And
one reason that we included the lender/servicer cases is because it
seems to be becoming bigger and bigger, and we're starting to see the
damage that's done.
But I wonder-maybe, Ron, you can address this. When I read
these cases, I see misconduct, I see sloppy lawyering, but I also get a
sense that these new lawyers are trying to fit the practice of law within
the confines of the larger marketplace. They're trying to meet some
demands that their non-lawyer clients are putting on them, and these
cases are reflecting a failure.
Do you see that tension, and if so, what do you think should be
done?
MR. PETERSON: Well, what we see-take Chicago for example. I
think eighty or ninety percent of the consumer mortgage foreclosure
work is done probably by four or five mills. The clients are sophisti-
cated and they're constantly-it's like a Dutch auction, how little
money can you do my foreclosure for? Well, the lawyers are ingenious
people, so they figure out what corners can we cut and still make a
profit at that place for a foreclosure. And it's these shortcuts where
somebody's sitting down with a tablet of affidavits and filling them out
in advance and then leaving the law firm, but they keep the tablet
anyways-
MS. VANCE: Which is In Re Rivera.41
40. 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 526-528 (2005).
41. Rivera, 342 B.R. 435.
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MR. PETERSON: That's the Rivera case. 42 And the fact that no-
body really knows what the default was, whether there was a de-
fault-they're just running these things through because of the
economy scale in order to be profitable considering what their clients
are paying them for the work.
JUDGE HOPKINS: How about the underlying documents related
to the foreclosure?
MR. PETERSON: Well, that's a double problem because not only
do you have the efficiency problem that I discussed, but-unlike
twenty years ago when I borrowed money for my first house, I was
assured that the bank made the loan, and I owed the bank the
money-today, ninety-five percent or more of all mortgages are sold
on a secondary or tertiary market. And God knows what's happened
to the documents because it is passed off from investor to investor,
from trust to trust.
And one of the little tortures that I have is that any secured lender's
lawyer who files a motion to vacate the stay, prior to my 341 meeting,
I serve them with a subpoena to produce all the documents. And that
has ended that practice.
PROFESSOR YOCHUM: One component of the mortgage cases
is, of course, sometimes the lender is right, but they can't prove it. But
to me that's a little bit different from an ethical violation, although it
certainly could be an ethical violation where you assert something that
you cannot prove. That is a violation of the rules.
But it's this mass of material, and I wonder-maybe I'll ask the
judge-when you have, you must have I don't know what the number
is of these cases coming through, what is your capacity as a judge to
monitor this behavior or are you relying on debtor's counsel or indeed
the debtors themselves to bring these issues to light?
JUDGE HOPKINS: You really do sort of rely on debtor's counsel.
The sheer volume of these cases is incredible. Ohio is one of those
states that the new economy of the twenty-first century never really
reached. We're an industrial-based economy and a lot of those facto-
ries are closing and moving out, at least in my area, and even strong
companies are closing those old, obsolete factories and moving off-
shore.
So what we're having is this demographic shift of people working-
not in factory jobs where they were able to make a very decent living
and be part of the middle class-they're now shifting to working at a
Staples or some other low level white-collar position where they sim-
42. Rivera, 342 B.R. 435.
2008]
568 DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL
ply cannot meet their obligations anymore with the income. So we're
seeing a huge volume of Chapter 13 filings where people are trying to
save their homes, Chapter 7 filings where they're trying to reaffirm on
the debt and get rid of the other debt, and it just isn't happening. So
we are seeing a huge volume of cases.
The more acute problem, I think, is with the foreclosure. In the
materials you'll see some cases from the Southern District, the district
court, where now under diversity jurisdiction a lot more lawyers are
bringing cases in the federal courts to foreclose against their debtors
because the state courts are so clogged. But the federal courts, under
their subject matter jurisdiction, are really questioning whether the
plaintiffs have the proper documentation to be able to bring to fore-
closure.43 It piques my interest to see really what the state courts were
doing beforehand. I know they were getting overrun, so whether or
not the courts were really checking to see if the underlying documents
supported foreclosure or not, really is a question.
PROFESSOR YOCHUM: One of the things you see in the mort-
gage servicing cases is individual courts setting up essentially local
rules by a decision about procedure. A couple of these cases you see
the lawyers nicked pretty bad, with an injunction that the lawyer do
maybe more than what you would consider doing under the reasona-
ble inquiry test, which is really what the test is throughout the bank-
ruptcy code and 9011. 44
I don't know if you want to talk about reasonable inquiry for a sec-
ond. Reasonable inquiry is what it is. When this came out in
BAPCPA, you'd ask a bankruptcy attorney what is the reasonable in-
quiry of my client and the answer would be none. You never had any
investigation; they'd come in, fill out the schedules and so forth.
There are a number of thoughts out there about what that word
means and whether there is a cognate in other forms of law, and I
know Ms. Vance has some opinions on this. Frankly, I would pick the
worst metaphor, and that's securities law, because I think that that's
what they're after. The same sort of due diligence investigation that a
securities lawyer might have to file-or do with respect to a securities
filing-which is more inquiry certainly than the ordinary bankruptcy
petitioner has done or is probably used to doing.
43. In re Foreclosure Cases, 521 F. Supp. 2d 650 (S.D. Ohio 2007); In re Foreclosure Cases,
2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95673 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 27, 2007); In re Foreclosure Cases, 2007 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 90812 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 27, 2007); Midwest Bank v. Davenport, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
87741 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 29, 2007); Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co. v. Key, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
94975 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 12, 2007).
44. FED. R. BANKR. P. 9011.
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A PARTICIPANT: There was a very recent case out of the middle
District of Florida, Everwood or Evergreen, 45 in which the sanctions
were $371,000 and a five year bar on appearing in that court for bring-
ing a recusal motion and filing three writs of mandamus based on es-
sentially a rumor. And there was no inquiry. And in that opinion the
judge goes into great detail about what reasonable inquiry is, and the
attorneys clearly did no inquiry.
PROFESSOR YOCHUM: That's always the easier one.
A PARTICIPANT: But there was-I think it was a very good dis-
cussion because it involved two different firms with a lot of people
deferring to other people trying to find cover. The judge gave no one
cover and put the onus on every attorney in the process, including the
firms, and said that the firms were responsible as well as the individual
attorneys.
PROFESSOR YOCHUM: That's absolutely correct. And you
should all know that one of the rules of professional conduct in all
jurisdictions is that the partners or the managing authority in a firm
are required to have in place mechanisms to ensure all individuals
comply with the rules of professional conduct and there is an addi-
tional rule, which is essentially a respondeat superior rule for the firm
based upon such conduct. May I ask a question? Who was the judge?
JUDGE HOPKINS: A good one.
A PARTICIPANT: I can't remember-
PROFESSOR YOCHUM: Bankruptcy judge?
MR. PETERSON: Briskman or Jennerman?
A PARTICIPANT: Briskman.
MS. VANCE: My red flag goes up when I hear that somebody made
a recusal motion because-and this is just a bias, I don't have anything
to back it up-I have a tendency to think that the one who's seeking
recusal is usually up to no good because there are so many bad ones.
But I want to get back to these mortgage servicing cases, if we
could, because this question of inquiry is very important and I think,
Judge, you were correct to point out that the new sections 526, 527,
and 528 of the Bankruptcy Code46 go to a class of lawyers or several
classes of lawyers in bankruptcy, only one of which Congress actively
sought to regulate.
And at the same time, we had these cases slowly coming in on the
mortgage servicing side and then of course Katie Porter released her
study last fall and she found, I forget the exact number, but over fifty
45. In re Evergreen Sec., Ltd., 2008 WL 2477635 (M.D. Fla. 2008).
46. 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 526-528 (2005).
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percent of the documents that these servicers and lenders were filing
in Chapter 13 cases were wrong, they were charging fees that they
weren't allowed to charge, they were coming in and seeking relief
from stay based on defaults that never occurred. 47
There was a recent case where, without advising the debtor, the
bank decided that it would no longer accept payments made at a
branch, and so when the debtor goes in, it takes the check, it gets
rejected, they go into default because the bank simply changed its pol-
icy on how the debtor could make the payments. Pretty outrageous
stuff going on.
But the real. question is where do the lawyers fit into it?
I think Rivera48 is a very clear case of a court saying, I really don't
care what the pressures of the market are. And the Rivera court actu-
ally even said specifically that if you have to risk losing a client, then
too bad, so sad. The opinion stated, "Lawyers must maintain their in-
dependence and resist, at the risk of losing a client or their employ-
ment, pressures which would undercut their professionalism." 49 And
Rivera is about two years old.
A much more recent case that I ran across yesterday, so unfortu-
nately I wasn't able to put it into your materials, is out of the District
of Massachusetts and it's In re Nosek,50 n-o-s-e-k. And this is probably
the most blistering one I've ever seen, and I wanted to share a couple
of quotes with you. What happened in this case is an adversary pro-
ceeding had continued for some time and then much later on it was,
"Oh, we've got the wrong plaintiff." It was the wrong person, it was
the same situation, but nobody knew who really held the mortgage
and had standing to sue.
The judge at one point said:
Similarly, Ameriquest's argument that the noteholder's identity was
disclosed during a deposition of one of its employees misses the
mark and, as noted above, so does the argument that the assignment
of the note and mortgage ultimately became a matter of public re-
cord. Ameriquest argues that assignments of notes and mortgages
frequently occur with documentation of the transfers recorded, and
even executed, at a later time. Moreover, Ameriquest represents
that it is not uncommon for the original noteholder or mortgagee to
take back the note and/or mortgage when a borrower defaults. Us-
47. Katherine M. Porter, Misbehavior and Mistake in Bankruptcy Mortgage Claims, U OF
IOWA LEGAL STUDmS RESEARCH PAPER No. 07-29, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=
1027961.
48. In re Rivera, 342 B.R. 435 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2006).
49. Id. at 468.
50. In re Nosek, 386 B.R. 374 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2008).
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ing these excuses, the parties' attitude appears to be that confusion
as to a party's role is understandable against the current commercial
climate. If the transfer of such negotiable instruments occurs at such
a fast pace and without timely recorded evidence of the transfers,
why should the Court and Debtor's counsel be expected to know
the role of the parties? The burden is clearly on the sophisticated,
albeit careless, lenders and servicers. 51
I wonder-any of you are welcome to chime in-is Judge Rosenthal
setting a standard here, at least for practitioners in the District of
Massachusetts?
And, just so you know, in another place in the opinion he says very
explicitly that the burden is on the creditor to demonstrate that they
actually are the person who's going to assert the claim.52 Do you think
that this is where this trend might go, these blistering decisions that
actually tell the rest of the community this is what I expect from here
on in? Judge?
JUDGE HOPKINS: I don't know how you could shift it to the
debtor. In terms of the secondary marketing, what Ron talked about
earlier, interestingly enough I got a call from a high school classmate
of mine who is now trading in the markets in New York. He asked me,
"What are your courts doing with these foreclosure cases?" He said,
"This makes our securities valueless. If we can't foreclose on the ac-
tual asset, who knows what the value of this paper is." I mean this is
real money here.
But you know, on the other end, we also have to think of the human
cost. I mean we're dealing with debtors who are seeking relief that the
Congress has sought fit to provide. And the constitution, as you know,
has a bankruptcy clause in it and it's been there for a long time, and
they should be able to take advantage of bankruptcy and try as they
might to save their home. And, someone's ox is going to get gored. I
think the commercial lenders are in a much better position to be able
to find assignees through the chain of title and come up with those
documents.
MS. VANCE: What do you think about the threat to the court sys-
tem? Because implicit in this decision, the Nosek 53 decision and some
others, are the standards that exist within the court, and the standards
of professionalism should and perhaps must give way to the person in
New York who's saying, "What are you doing? This is worth a lot of
money."
51. Id. at 382-3.
52. Id. at 383.
53. Id.
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Do you think that the system is threatened?
JUDGE HOPKINS: These are ancient principles. Professor
Yochum has gone through Rule 11. 54 And if you're going to file it,
you've got to be able to have a reasonable basis in fact and law to
support your argument. Indeed, if you look at these mortgage foreclo-
sure cases, 55 the courts are really trying to protect the prestige of the
federal courts.
When you talk about standing, you've got to have injury, you've got
to have the correct relationship to be able to pursue these claims and
have proper adjudication of the claim. I don't see how courts can get
there otherwise; courts can't go on supposition and innuendo.
MR. PETERSON: I think ultimately too, you're going to see the
trustee's bar picking up on this, and we're challenging more mortgages
than we used to.
I just had an opinion out of Judge Schmetterer 56 about a month ago
where we tossed a mortgage, one that was recorded in New York on
Highland Park, Illinois property, and the other mortgage was tossed
because they didn't identify the indebtedness.
But I think the trustees who eat what they kill have a tremendous
incentive here to police this system.
MS. VANCE: How would they do so?
MR. PETERSON: By objecting to the secured creditor and putting
him to a screw. I mean I'd make a lot of money if I could vitiate a
mortgage and sell the home free and clear.
MS. VANCE: What happens if there is no money for you to be
made? I mean-I guess my question is how effective do you think the
trustees will be within this system?
MR. PETERSON: Well, if I have a $500,000 house in Highland
Park and I can knock out the mortgage, I get a commission for that
and I get to pay my lawyer. And the discovery on this is pretty simple.
I have a standard can 2004 document subpoena, and I want to see the
documents, including both copies of the right of decision under the
Truth in Lending Act.57 You'd be amazed the number of secured lend-
ers who can't cough up the documents.
54. FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
55. In re Foreclosure Cases, 521 F. Supp. 2d 650; In re Foreclosure Cases, 2007 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 95673; In re Foreclosure Cases, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90812; Midwest Bank, 2007 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 87741; Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94975.
56. In re Berg, 387 B.R. 524 (Bankr. N.D. Il1. 2008).
57. Truth in Lending Act, contained in Title I of the Consumer Credit Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 90-321, 82 Stat. 146 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667f (2000)).
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MS. VANCE: What do you think would be the ultimate outcome?
Because I think the market forces here are very strong personally.
MR. PETERSON: Well, I think if enough trustees start knocking
these out, the secured lending bar is going to have to rethink what
they're doing.
PROFESSOR YOCHUM: Actually, I'm struck as outside the world
of it, but computer programming is a lot of the problem, isn't it?
JUDGE HOPKINS: Yes.
MR. PETERSON: I've seen a shift over on the mortgages to an
electronic mortgage recording service. No matter who owns the note,
we now can find the mortgage. And you have a public trustee who
holds title to the mortgages in places like Colorado. So there is a re-
sponse in the marketplace to this problem.
PROFESSOR YOCHUM: That specific problem will be taken care
of technologically over time, but I think it's going to be a while.
You know, lawyers sometimes complain that compliance with ethics
results in loss of cash. That's the point. I told Cathy, this is a cheap
joke, but I'm available for doing a topic called sex with clients, and I
like to call sex with clients-
JUDGE HOPKINS: Available?
PROFESSOR YOCHUM: I am available. There will be a sign-up
sheet outside. But it's amazing to me about how many lawyers have
sex with clients when the ethical solution is simply, in the language of
the code, withdraw. That is, don't be their lawyer anymore.
JUDGE HOPKINS: Ron, I thought you were going to go into trus-
tee suits. We had an interesting case out of the Seventh Circuit on
that.
MR. PETERSON: Yeah. Before I start, I will make this ethical dis-
closure. I am the counsel for Andrew Maxwell. On March 21st of this
year, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit considered the case
of Maxwell v. KPMG.58 This was an appeal from a decision by District
Judge Joan Gottschall that granted summary judgment in favor of the
accounting house.
The issue that the trustee argued to the Seventh Circuit was as fol-
lows: The accountants purportedly missed something that-there are
a lot of different names for it-home running, which is that the in-
come was overstated prior to a merger. It was overstated by about
fifteen million dollars. The trustee's argument was that but for this
fifteen million dollar overstatement, we never would have bought this
turkey, and therefore we would have suffered no damages. And there-
58. Maxwell v. KPMG LLP, 520 F.3d 713 (7th Cir. 2008).
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fore we're entitled to the entire loss of our market cap because we
wouldn't have lost it had we not done the merger.
The trustee had some argument to make. This case was controlled
by Illinois law, and Illinois law basically says foreseeability in a tort
case is a jury question. When the Court of Appeals got this-now
think of the panel we have here-Judge Posner, Judge Easterbrook,
and Judge Wood, looked at it and said, wait a minute, this debtor suf-
fered its losses because the internet market imploded. This was a four
billion dollar stock swap. Don't tell me a sixteen million dollar over-
statement in income was going to affect anything.
Now, it was a very scholarly opinion as to what a plaintiff trustee or
any plaintiff must show in a tort case in terms of foreseeability and
proximate cause. And had the opinion ended on page six, we wouldn't
be discussing it here today.
MS. VANCE: But then-
MR. PETERSON: But then-and this matter is not before the
court-but Judge Easterbrook then launches into a study, a damage
study that was done by a very prominent damage study firm, Michel-
Shaked, out of Massachusetts, a lot of Harvard professor types. And
what they said in terms of the damage study-the damage study's
nuts.
To make matters worse, the lawyer was not a bankruptcy lawyer
who argued the appeal for the trustee. He was asked by Diana Wood,
"Who do you represent?" to which he responded, "the creditors, of
course."
Well, the creditors in this case, according to the trustee, were about
ninety-three million dollars, and they're suing KPMG for six hundred
million dollars. And so the judge concluded this looks like, smells like,
and is seen in the company of strike suits, and they brought this num-
ber so big that poor KPMG would-bet the company litigation.
Well, if the opinion had ended at page nine, we would not be having
this discussion.
MS. VANCE: But then-
MR. PETERSON: He then goes on to say, when you look at the
tenuousness of the trustee's liability case, and then you look at this
damage study, he uses the "F" word. He calls it frivolous.
And then he turns his eye toward the bankruptcy judges and says,
you bankruptcy judges aren't watching the trustees very well in terms
of their litigation judgment. And then he goes on to state: In a private
litigator he has to worry about the vendors, he has to worry about the
shareholders, he has to worry about the government, he has to worry
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about customers, and there are great inhibitions in a private litigator
to bringing lawsuits such as the one at bar.
Bankruptcy trustees walk into the cases, they walk into this room,
there is this pile of cash, and all they have to think about is how do I
spend the cash. They make extortionist demands upon innocent par-
ties, and if they don't pay, the trustee sues him.
Therefore, he concludes, we will invite the appellee to bring a mo-
tion under Federal Rule Appellate Procedure 3859 and under Federal
Rule Bankruptcy 901160 in the district court and if these sanctions are
allowed, and here's the parenthetical without citation to authority, of
course the trustee will be personally liable, not the estate, close paren.
And then the final sentence in the opinion is: Of course we're not
prejudging the outcome of the sanctions motion.
Now, several interesting questions come up from this. Number one,
I think it's one of the responsibilities of the NABT 61 and other bar
associations to educate the court of appeals as to the number of inhi-
bitions we work under, including the good judge here who approves
my fees, the U.S. Trustee who never leaves me alone, creditors in
large cases who always encourage me to spend my money as opposed
to theirs, and the fact that we trustees often eat what we kill and there
is no pile of cash when I walk into a case, and I'm betting the firm's
resources that I can win. And I am very, very conservative on how I
bet my firm's resources.
The other question though, and I'll pose this to the judge, because I
had this situation, Judge, down the river from you at New Albany.
Judge Lorch last week or two weeks ago announced that he would
pre-screen a suit before it was brought by the debtor to undo a pre-
leverage buyout pre-petition. And I had never heard of a bankruptcy
judge doing that before.
I guess my question to you, in light of Judge Posner's epistle, do you
feel as a judge that you have a duty to screen and question the trus-
tee's litigation judgment before the fact as opposed to after the fact
when you sign off on the deeds?
MS. VANCE: Or any party.
JUDGE HOPKINS: I really did not feel I had that obligation. Was
this epistle by Judge Lorch prior to the KPMG decision?
MR. PETERSON: No, it was about a month after.
59. FED. R. App. P. 38.
60. FED. R. BANKR. P. 9011.
61. National Association of Bankruptcy Trustees
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JUDGE HOPKINS: Well, he obviously read the research that Pro-
fessor Yochum shared with us with regard to the ability of a trustee to
protect him or herself. The trustee needs to get the blessing of the
bankruptcy court before filing suit. Under that rubric, you get the pro-
tection of the judicial immunity we enjoy, but only if the suit is
brought pursuant to an order from the court.
My thinking is that what the bankruptcy court is trying to do really
is protect the trustee, but that really isn't our role. And I was really
interested to see the patchwork of law on this subject.
PROFESSOR YOCHUM: And we know in this panel we don't
want to talk too much about trustee liability, personal liability.
MR. PETERSON: I don't want to talk about it at all.
PROFESSOR YOCHUM: I'm a neutral. I'm a professor. But it is
an amazing old body of law that has not been re-explored. And the
last good law review article, as a matter of fact, I found on the subject
was from the Commercial Law Leagues's older journal, sort of the
antecedent to this one; trustees traditionally had immunity as judicial
officers.
As an academic, I'd want to research whether the new United
States trustee system affects that immunity. Personal liability was al-
ways available against trustees for stealing or doing something outra-
geously stupid. It is consistent, however, with any expenditure of
assets by the estate because that's what litigation is, you're going to
spend some money to perhaps be able to get bankruptcy court ap-
proval of that expenditure in advance.
I think that it's going to take a while to litigate this out. In this
particular case, 62 the trustee was a party plaintiff and thus, theoreti-
cally under Rule 11,63 is subject to Rule 11 or 901164 style sanctions.
There's a huge body of law talking about trustees being nominal par-
ties, but in fact, the real party is the estate itself.
Traditionally, only gross negligence-and that's the expression,
gross negligence-would be grounds for personal liability. I'm not
sure-and I talked with Cathy about this, these are two different
words-whether frivolous is the same as gross negligence. They may
be very close.
I will say one other thing from a general perspective out of this case.
Judge Posner, Mr. Law and Economics, heavily into numbers, when
you ask him in his opinion what does frivolous mean, he gives no
62. Maxwell, 520 F.3d 713.
63. FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
64. FED. R. BANKR. P. 9011.
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numbers. He says a frivolous appeal has some chance of success, light-
ning may strike. But if the probability is very low, the suit is frivolous.
Thus, you know, it's still fairly gray.
I'll make one final point about this point from my perspective on
frivolousness and my sort of demarcation. I take this to be a fact-
based frivolous case, and maybe it's fact based because Judge Posner
doesn't know the law, but he's saying that one of the standard ele-
ments of negligence was unprovable, that is, that you had no evidence
with respect to cause and that makes this case frivolous.65
JUDGE HOPKINS: I'll tell you one thing that I will do if I find a
case coming before me that perhaps may not meet the frivolous stan-
dard, but perhaps is weak on facts or law, is to deal with the concern
in the Rule 1666 conference that I often have with these adversary
proceedings.
If you look at that rule, it's pretty aggressive in terms of the reach
that the district court or the bankruptcy court in this instance has. The
court can strike frivolous claims, it can strike defenses in the course of
the conference that you're having. And I've often done that with cases
where I found the claim itself may not warrant further adjudication.
MR. PETERSON: I'll make just three comments. One, what's at
stake here for Mr. Maxwell in his personal capacity is five and a half
million dollars in sanctions.67 You can imagine the expression on his
wife's face when he came home for dinner that Friday night.
Number two, the standard for trustee personal liability is a three-
way split in the circuits. The Seventh Circuit has historically been will-
ful and wanton conduct, the Fifth Circuit I believe is gross negligence,
and there are a few circuits out in the east that are simple negligence.
This was a question, by the way, of both fact and law because the
question was which rule of law in the state of Illinois applies because
Illinois governed, and whether foreseeability was to be left to the
tender loving care of the jury or it was a question of fault.
But again, it's an ethical question here that we all as plaintiffs bring
lawsuits. And what is the difference between a perfectly good, aggres-
sive, let's get money for the creditors and approve the state lawsuit as
opposed to a strike suit where we are acting like nothing more than
shameless extortionists? That line is sometimes very gray. But again,
here the trustee in Maxwell had his independent counsel, it wasn't his
law firm, and he had hired one of the best damage experts in the coun-
65. Maxwell, 520 F.3d 713.
66. FED. R. Civ. P. 16.
67. Maxwell, 520 F.3d 713.
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try, and even with all that he finds himself staring at a five and a half
million dollar sanctions order.68
MS. VANCE: I think where that line is drawn is actually in the eye
of the beholder as well because you could ask ten different people
where the line should be drawn and you would get ten different re-
sponses, which brings me to one last topic that I want to raise after-I
want to give Judge Hopkins some time to talk about a particular item.
Professor Yochum, you mentioned a little bit ago about regulatory
and legislative efforts moving into the regulation of attorneys. And I
don't want to spend too much time on it, but I would like thoughts
from any of you actually about what seems to be an increasing ten-
dency of-I've seen it at the federal level, I don't know the extent to
which it's happening at the state level, but I'm sure it is, especially
when you're talking about tort claims and asbestos and things like
that-but it seems as if Congress thinks that part of what it ought to
do is regulate lawyers.
Certainly everybody in the bankruptcy world knows what happened
with BAPCPA. We know, like I said earlier, it was one group of attor-
neys-attorneys who represent consumer debtors in Chapter 7 cases
and in some instances Chapter 13 cases. These were the bad actors,
and these were the ones who had to be regulated.
And my question is threefold for anybody who wants to chime in. Is
this appropriate; is it necessary; and in order to accomplish the goal,
do the backers of these efforts by definition make the public's percep-
tion of us and our profession worse because they have to say how bad
we are in order to convince everybody that the legislation ought to be
passed?
Now, I tried to-the Congressional Record is really hard to search,
but some very very bad things were said about debtors' attorneys in
order to get these provisions of BAPCPA done.
MR. PETERSON: Well, you have a situation in the prior republi-
can Congress, you had Senator Grassley, a non-lawyer, as chairman of
the Judiciary Committee, and that was before Senator Specter. And
he really believes that there were too many frivolous lawsuits in the
United States, starting with the McDonald's coffee cup case.69
MS. VANCE: Let me ask you a question before you go on. This has
puzzled me forever. How does a case that gets to a jury verdict get
called frivolous? That's always baffled me. The frivolous ones I
thought were the ones you're supposed to weed out through
68. Id.
69. Liebeck v. McDonald's Restaurants, P.T.S., Inc., 1994 WL 360309 (N.M. Dist. 2004).
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12(b)(6) 70 and things like that. How do you get all the way to the jury
on a claim that's frivolous? I'm not asking that of you, it's just a ques-
tion that's always been in my mind, because a jury issued a verdict in
that case.
MR. PETERSON: Well, a lot of judges, and I'll let the judge speak
for himself, I think there's an inclination by a lot of judges to let cases
go to the jury rather than take the case away from the jury on the
theory if the jury brings in a verdict for the defendant, then they didn't
have to do any work. And then if the jury brings in the wrong verdict,
then they have the painful process of an N.O.V. How do you feel,
Judge?
JUDGE HOPKINS: Oh, I don't know, I find facts under Rule
7052.71 I haven't had the experience of conducting a jury trial as a
bankruptcy judge.
MR. PETERSON: I think you see two trends in Congress. There's a
feeling that the lawyers are bringing too many frivolous suits, and Sen-
ator Grassley's response was almost to make Rule 1172 mandatory.
Somebody had to bring it. And you had to have this piece of ancillary
litigation tagged on.
There is also a movement in Congress, I think a move from the
American rule to the English rule. In the English rule, if I brought a
lawsuit, I have to post a bond so that in the event I lose, I have to pay
the defendant his legal fees. And I think if you look at some of the
writings of Judge Easterbrook, he sort of feels romanced of that whole
concept of let the loser pay.
The second and unfortunate concept we see moving on is Congress
doesn't like common law judges. Congress wants to codify everything
and strip from the judges every conceivable piece of discretion they
might have on this earth so that they can achieve this legislative pur-
pose. And BAPCPA certainly is a horrible example.
JUDGE HOPKINS: I think that's right. And I think, Cathy, you
wrote a piece where you said other lawyers, other than bankruptcy
lawyers, beware. 73
MS. VANCE: It's in the materials.
JUDGE HOPKINS: Yes. That's coming.
PROFESSOR YOCHUM: Well, fee shifting was the original ap-
proach to frivolous litigation. I mean, that seemed to be most accessi-
70. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
71. FED. R. BANKR. P. 7052.
72. FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
73. Catherine E. Vance, Professionalism and the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer
Protection Act of 2005, Sept. 30, 2005.
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ble. And, again, Rule 1174 is the example, but in every area of law
now, there are fee-shifting statutes.
I'm going to ask the judge a question. You know, we talk about
legislative response or judicial response through the rule process. Do
you think that the judges are pulling the trigger more than they used
to? Is that okay to ask?
MS. VANCE: Of course it's okay.
PROFESSOR YOCHUM: I don't want to, you know, get shot.
JUDGE HOPKINS: Our materials are chocked full of instances
where judges are really sort of pulling the trigger, but it seems to me
that the sanctions imposed in each of these cases was justified where
lawyer misconduct is occurring.
I had another instance come up where this whole discharge by plain
language took place. It occurred for the first time in the student loan
area where, as we all know, plaintiffs have to bring an action under
Section 523(a)(8) 75 in order to discharge a student loan.
After the Andersen76 and Pardee77 decisions from the Tenth and
Ninth Circuits, a number of debtor's attorneys thought it was a clever
trick, or at least maybe they felt an ethical obligation under this con-
cept of zealous representation, to insert in their plans a discharge pro-
vision for student loans. And, if the creditor, the state agency that was
in charge of collecting the student loan, didn't catch the discharge lan-
guage when served with a copy of the plan, it became res judicata
under the Pardee78 decision.
So I took action, having discovered that provision or clause in a
plan. In the show cause hearing, I told the attorney that that sort of
practice stepped over the line. In instances like that, clearly in my
opinion, courts are justified in correcting the attorneys. I don't know
that my colleagues are pulling the trigger any sooner than they should.
PROFESSOR YOCHUM: I didn't mean more than they should,
but more.
JUDGE HOPKINS: But you see the punishment meted out, when
you see what Judge Isicoff did in "the few french fries short" case 79 it
was a rational, well-reasoned, and measured response. I think it was
proportional to the harm done. She had a show cause hearing. The
74. FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
75. 11 U.S.C.A. § 523(a)(8) (2005).
76. Andersen v. UNIPAC-NEBHELP, 179 F.3d 1253 (10th Cir. 1999).
77. Great Lakes Higher Educ. Corp. v. Pardee, 193 F.3d 1083 (9th Cir. 1999).
78. Id.
79. Order to Show Cause, Goldberg v. Mount Sinai Med. Ctr. of Greater Miami, Inc., No. 07-
1210-BKC-LMI (Bankr. S.D. Fla. May 21, 2007).
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attorney realized the error of his ways, and the only punishment she
imposed essentially was requiring the attorney to take a course in pro-
fessionalism in Florida.
I've had similar things occur, and what I did in one instance, it was a
business Chapter 13 case, was order the lawyer to speak at a CLE
program on how to handle a business Chapter 13 case. He's not ful-
filled his obligation yet. He doesn't appear before me anymore, I left
him alone, but it was a troublesome matter.
PROFESSOR YOCHUM: Bob has a question.
MR. BERNSTEIN: Earlier you asked about whether a trustee
would be-whether trustees were policing the creditors where there
was nothing in it for the trustee and I'm not sure that there is ever-I
guess there might be a case where there wouldn't be anything for the
trustee, but I wanted to mention in Pittsburgh the Chapter 13 trustee
has filed 293 motions for sanctions against Countrywide with respect
to Countrywide allegedly losing payments that she transmitted. 80
Her fear is that there will be charges somewhere in the account or
adverse action against the debtor down the road and that the burden
shouldn't be on these debtors to find that, it should be somehow clari-
fied by the courts. And Countrywide is the target of lots of things
going on, but technically one of her points was it's her duty to police
this on behalf of the Chapter 13 debtors.
But incidentally, in her prayer for relief, one of the prayers in each
of the 293 motions is, I believe, a two thousand dollar sanction for a
motion paid to her for her efforts. So maybe there is never a time
when there is really nothing in it for everyone.
MS. VANCE: Well, I think that we could probably do a program on
the trustee's role in all this, the mortgage lender/servicer sort of thing,
which is to say I'm going to try to make a segue away from that. I want
to say it's easy to slip into what the lenders and the servicers are
doing.
What we want you to come away with is the extent to which the
attorneys' ethical and professionalism standards are implicated when
they file motions for relief from stay based on information that is just
completely wrong and that nobody sought to verify or when they take
action on behalf of an entity that actually has no interest in the
property.
So I think that all of those things are very important, but our point
here is to focus on where the attorneys fit and the expressions like that
80. In re Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 384 B.R. 373 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2008).
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of the Rivera8 l court that you don't get to waver from your ethical
duties. You don't get to put aside professionalism because it's more
profitable to do so. And that it's definitely a tension for these attor-
neys, but like I said, it's so easy to slip into what the servicers and the
lenders are doing because you've got some pretty outrageous facts in
all of these, but I fear that we only have a couple of minutes left and
we only have about three, Judge. Is that enough time for you to talk
about your mentoring?
JUDGE HOPKINS: Sure. I'll take whatever time is allotted to me.
Judges are a subset of lawyers, so I can probably cut it short.
MS. VANCE: And you're also more trusted than us, remember.
JUDGE HOPKINS: Cathy asked me to speak because she had to
sit through a luncheon talk I gave last year at our Midwest Regional
Bankruptcy Seminar in Cincinnati. Last year I was president of the
NCBJ82 and, you know, as any good trial lawyer, you want to have a
story to tell or at least have a theme when you're presenting your case
to your colleagues.
We have a number of new judges, as you know the bankruptcy
bench has turned over quite a bit in the last few years. We now have a
real mix-some older judges who've been on for thirty years or more,
and some who are very young. So, I wanted to really strike a theme
with my colleagues on an issue that I thought that we needed to deal
with, frankly.
And so I told them the little story about myself and my family. I was
born in South Georgia, we moved to Ohio in the '60s ostensibly be-
cause of the conditions that existed in the south in the '60s, epitomized
by a case called Screws v. United States.83 It was a 1945 decision from
the Supreme Court, and the story about this case was told in our fam-
ily for many, many years because of the person who was involved.
What happened in this case was the sheriff of Baker County, Georgia
named Screws had essentially killed an African-American man who
he had held a grudge against for some time.
The State never filed any charges criminally against Screws, but the
Federal Government did, believe it or not, in 1945. An attorney
named John Doar who had been part of the Kennedy Justice Depart-
ment, but was a Republican holdover from the previous administra-
tion before, was the real inspiration behind that case.
81. In re Rivera, 342 B.R. 435 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2006).
82. National Conference of Bankruptcy Judges
83. Screws v. U.S., 325 U.S. 91 (1945).
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The story had been passed down through my family in sort of
hushed tones because of the obvious pain involved. The man killed in
the case, Robert Hall, had been my great uncle. He was brutally
beaten in broad daylight on the steps of the courthouse and died over-
night in jail.
That story really stuck with me as a youngster and later inspired me
to become a lawyer. I really wanted to be a public lawyer and one who
defended the rights of citizens under the Constitution.
A funny thing happened on the way to the forum. Obviously, I'm
practicing or judging in the bankruptcy area-a commercial law field.
But nonetheless, those doors are open, and I stand on the shoulders of
those who went before me who opened those doors.
I also went to a small college in Maine called Bowdoin College,
which has a very rich history and tradition in terms of public service.
The motto of the College is "to serve the public good." And I've al-
ways been one who has found it most comfortable being a public law-
yer, having served in the Justice Department before taking the bench.
In relating the story of the Screws case, I was trying to convey to my
colleagues, and to those attending the luncheon, a couple of things.
Cathy has a slide that didn't make it. One of the things that we can do
as lawyers to improve ourselves and the way the public views us is to
educate the public about how to handle common legal problems. An-
other instance was do a better job of policing and regulating ourselves.
And the third was do more public service and pro bono work.
The point that I was trying to make with my colleagues and my
friends was that we are all public servants. Through research, I found
a very good quote from Professor Edward Re who gave a speech at
Saint John's University Law School some time ago which captures this
ideal. Professor Re said the word profession is derived from the Latin
professio, professionem, which means to make a public declaration.
The term evolved to describe the calling or an occupation that re-
quired new entrants to take an oath professing their dedication to the
ideals associated with this learned calling.
Our English colleagues, from whom we borrow not merely our
common law but also many of our legal customs and traditions, speak
of the calling of the law. The word "calling" conveys the thought that
students of the law are not merely admitted to the bar for the practice
of the law, but are called to the bar.
And so from that theme, I went on to say that I think as lawyers in
order to improve our image and really fulfill the public calling that we
have to do some sort of public service. And, I advocate pro bono
service.
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UCLA Law Professor Ken Klee and some other scholars at our
NCBJ program in 2006 held a debate as to whether major law firms,
commercial law firms, should be in the business of pro bono work
anymore when it comes to representing consumer debtors. And I can
tell you that the need is great and that there are many persons who
need bankruptcy protection. I'm very proud to say that some of my
colleagues, particularly ones in South Florida, and also in Georgia and
Houston where the pro bono programs were really dying on the vine,
have ruled that lawyers are not debt-relief agencies and that these
provisions, as harsh as they are, don't apply to lawyers, even if the
attorney doesn't get the pro bono case through a non-profit agency
pursuant to the safe harbor clause of BAPCPA.
So I would encourage everyone to be more active in the pro bono
area.
The other thing I told my colleagues and I told those that were in
attendance in Cincinnati was I think we can do some things to mentor
younger lawyers-especially ones of color.
I'm one of the first to have attended college in my family, and it was
very important for me to have a strong mentor. My mentor was Judge
Alan Norris of the Sixth Circuit where I clerked. I think that we can
reach out to minority lawyers who are perhaps laboring as the first
who've gone through law school or college to help in that regard. And
it's easier than ever now because of e-mail.
I know Judge Ann Williams, who is a gem and really a very good
friend, has a program here in Chicago where she does a lot of this kind
of thing. If you touch base with her, I'm sure she'll put you in touch
with minority students who could use a mentor through the Just The
Beginning Foundation.
MS. VANCE: We wanted very much to end on a high note and to
encourage everybody to remember that you have to be a part of the
profession, not just an advocate for one client, but an advocate for a
system that is fair and is just.
Thank you all for coming.
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